Bacon's College

The erection and institution of an order or society, which we call Salomon’s House, the noblest foundation, as we think, that ever was upon the earth, and the lanthorn of this Kingdom. It is dedicated to the study of the works and creatures of God. Some thing it beareth the founder’s name a little corrupted, as if it should be Salomona’s House; but the records write it as it is spoken. I find in ancient records this order or society is sometimes called Salomon’s House, and sometimes the College of the Six Days. God had created the world, and all that therein is, within six days.

Read Bacon's Arguments

The Great Instauration in Six Parts: College Curriculum.

Part I: Advancement of Learning: Partitions of Sciences. Partitiones Scientiarum, a map of knowledge, as it was at the time; a brief description of the existing state of the whole of learning; with its deficiencies noted, its divisions marked out, and due credit given to what was good.

This, an introduction to the whole, to map out the whole land, which Bacon hoped to colonise and cultivate, was first sketched out in the Advancement of Learning, and afterwards published at much greater length in Latin in the De Augmentis Scientiarum, in the year 1623.

This division alone was completed. Survey and Extension of the Sciences; or, the Advancement of Learning: gives the substance, or general description of the knowledge which mankind at present possess: choosing to swell a little upon things already received, that we may the easier perfect the old, and lead on to new; being equally inclined to cultivate the discoveries of antiquity, as to strike out fresh paths of science.

Bacon's explanation to this part:

Survey and Extension of the Sciences; or, the Advancement of Learning.
The first whereof gives the substance, or general description of the knowledge which mankind at present possess; choosing to dwell a little upon things already received, that we may the easier perfect the old, and lead on to new; being equally inclined to cultivate the discoveries of antiquity, as to strike out fresh paths of science.

In classing the sciences, we comprehend not only the tilings already invented and known, but also those omitted and wanted; for the intellectual globe, as well as the terrestrial, has both its frosts and deserts. It is therefore no wonder if we sometimes depart from the common divisions.

For an addition, whilst it alters the whole, must necessarily alter the parts, and their sections; whereas the received divisions are only fitted to the received sum of the sciences, as it now stands.

With regard to the things we shall note as defective; it will be our method to give more than the bare titles, or short heads of what we desire to have done; with particular care, where the dignity or difficulty of the subject requires it, either to lay down the rules for effecting the work, or make an attempt of our own, by way of example, or pattern, of the whole. For it concerns our own character, no less than the advantage of others, to know that a mere capricious idea has not presented the subject to our mind, and that all we desire and aim at is a wish.

For our designs are within the power of all to, compass, and we ourselves have certain and evident demonstrations of their utility. We come not hither, as augurs, to measure out regions in our mind by divination, but like generals, to invade them for conquest.

And this is the first part of the work.

Part II: Novum Organum Scientiarum; or Precepts for the Interpretation of Nature: the new Instrument (or Logic, as he delights to call it) by whose means Nature may be induced to yield up her secrets for the good of man.

It was to commence with a destructive treatise; a treatise which should clear away the phantoms and illusions which had crowded thickly around knowledge: there was to follow a very brief account of the object on which this new instrument was to be employed; then, in detail, descriptions of the nine auxilia intellectus, which were to assist the mind in the Interpretation of Nature, and in true and perfect Induction.

Of these nine parts but one is complete; and of the others hardly any trace remains. And it should always be remembered by those who criticise the Method of the philosopher, that of that Method only a very small part has been laid before us. The Novum Organum, then, is instrumental, and puts into men’s hands the means by which they may successfully appeal to Nature and embraces the doctrine of a more perfect use of reason, and the true helps of the intellectual faculties, so as to raise and enlarge the powers of the mind; and, as far as the condition of humanity allows, to fit it to conquer the difficulties and obscurities of nature.

Thus then it appears how small a portion of the great scheme is filled up: and of that small portion filled up, what a little piece is that which the Novum Organum covers.

Bacon's explanation to this part:

Novum Organum; or, Precepts for the Interpretation of Nature.
When we have gone through the ancient arts, we shall prepare the human understanding for pressing on beyond them. The second object of the work embraces the doctrine of a more perfect use of reason, and the true helps of the intellectual faculties, so as to raise and enlarge the powers of the mind; and, as far as the condition of humanity allows, to fit it to conquer the difficulties and obscurities of nature.

The thing we mean, is a kind of logic, by us called The Art of interpreting Nature; as differing widely from the common logic, which, however, pretends to assist and direct the understanding, and in that they agree: but the difference betwixt them consists in three things, viz., the end, the order of demonstrating, and the grounds of inquiry.
The end of our new logic is to find, not arguments, but arts; not what agrees with principles, but principles themselves: not probable reasons, but plans and designs of works a different intention producing a different effect.

In one the adversary is conquered by dispute, and in the other nature by works. The nature and order of the demonstrations agree with this object. For in common logic, almost our whole labour is spent upon the syllogism.

Logicians hitherto appear scarcely to have noticed induction, passing it over with some slight comment. But we reject the syllogistic method as being too confused, and allowing nature to escape out of our hands. For though nobody can doubt that those things which agree with the middle term agree with each other, nevertheless, there is this source of error, that a syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words; and words are but the token and signs of tilings.

Now, if the first notions, which are, as it were, the soul of words, and the basis of every philosophical fabric, are hastily abstracted from things, and vague and not clearly defined and limited, the whole structure falls to the ground. We therefore reject the syllogism, and that not only as regards first principles, to which logicians do not apply them, but also with respect to intermediate propositions, which the syllogism contrives to manage in such a way as to render barren in effect, unfit for practice, and clearly unsuited to the active branch of the sciences.

Nevertheless, we would leave to the syllogism, and such celebrated and applauded demonstrations, their jurisdiction over popular and speculative acts; while, in everything relating to the nature of things, we make use of induction for both our major and minor propositions; for we consider induction as that form of demonstration which closes in upon nature and presses on, and, as it were, mixes itself with action.

Whence the common order of demonstrating is absolutely inverted; for instead of flying immediately from the senses, and particulars, to generals, as to certain fixed poles, about which disputes always turn, and deriving others from these by intermediates, in a short, indeed, but precipitate manner, fit for controversy, but unfit to close with nature; we continually raise up propositions by degrees, and in the last place, come to the most general axioms, which are not notional, but well defined, and what nature allows of, as entering into the very essence of things.

[This passage, though tersely and energetically expressed, is founded upon a misconception of deduction, or, as Bacon phrases it, syllogistic reasoning, and its relation to induction. The two processes are only reverse methods of inferences, the one concluding from a general to a particular, and the other from a particular to a general, and both.
Schemata (shapes) are resolvable into propositions, and propositions into words, which, as he says, are but the tokens and signs of things. Now if these first notions, which are as it were the soul of words and the basis of every philosophic fabric, be hastily abstracted from things, and vague and not clearly defined and limited, the whole structure, whether erected by induction or deduction, or both, as is most frequently the case, must fall to the ground.
The error, therefore, does not lie in the deductive mode of proof, without which physical science could never advance beyond its empirical stage, but in clothing this method in the vulgar language of the day, and reasoning upon its terms as if they pointed at some fact or antithesis in nature, instead of previously testing the accuracy of such expressions by experiment and observation.
As such notions are more general than the individual cases out of which they arise, it follows that this inquiry must be made through the medium of induction, and the essential merit of Bacon lies in framing a system of rules by which this ascending scale of inference may be secured from error.
As the neglect of this important preliminary to scientific investigation vitiated all the Aristotelian physics, and kept the human mind stationary for two thousand years, hardly too much praise can be conferred upon the philosopher who not only pointed out the gap but supplied the materials for its obliteration.
The ardency of his nature, however, urged him to extremes, and he confounded the accuracy of the deductive method with the straw and stubble on which it attempted to erect a system of physics. In censuring intermediate propositions, Bacon appears to have been unaware that he was condemning the only forms through which reason or inference can manifest itself, and lecturing mankind on the futility of an instrument which he was employing in every page of his book.]

But the more difficult part of our task consists in the form of induction, and the judgment to be made by it; for that form of the logicians which proceeds by simple enumeration, is a childish thing, concludes unsafely, lies open to contradictory instances, and regards only common matters; yet determines nothing: whilst the sciences require such a form of induction, as can separate, adjust, and verify experience, and come to a necessary determination by proper exclusions and rejections.

Nor is this all; for we likewise lay the foundations of the sciences stronger and closer, and begin our inquiries deeper than men have hitherto done, bringing those things to the test which the common logic has taken upon trust. The logicians borrow the principles of the sciences from the sciences themselves, venerate the first notions of the mind, and acquiesce in the immediate informations of the senses, when rightly disposed; but we judge, that a real logic should enter every province of the sciences with a greater authority than their own principles can give; and that such supposed principles should be examined, till they become absolutely clear and certain.

As for first notions of the mind, we suspect all those that the understanding, left to itself, procures; nor ever allow them till approved and authorized by a second judgment. And with respect to the informations of the senses, we have many ways of examining them; for the senses are fallacious, though they discover their own errors; but these lie near, whilst the means of discovery are remote.

The senses are faulty in two respects, as they either fail or deceive us. For there are many things that escape the senses, though ever so rightly disposed; as by the subtlety of the whole body, or the minuteness of its parts; the distance of place; the slowness or velocity of motion; the commonness of the object, &c. Neither do the senses, when they lay hold of a thing, retain it strongly; for evidence, and the informations of sense, are in proportion to a man, and not in proportion to the universe.

[Bacon held, that every perception is nothing more than the consciousness of some body acting either interiorly or from without upon that portion of the frame which is the point of contact. Hence all the knowledge we have of the material world arises from the movements which it generates in our senses. These sensations simply inform us that a wide class of objects exist independent of ourselves, which affect us in a certain manner, and do not convey into our minds the real properties of such objects so much as the effects of the relation in which they stand to our senses.
Human knowledge thus becomes relative; and that which we call the relation of objects to one another, is nothing more than the relation which they have to our organization. Hence as these relations of objects, either internal or exterior to the mind vary, sensations must vary along with them, and produce, even in the same individual, a crowd of impressions either conflicting or in some measure opposed to each other.
So far as these feelings concern morals, it is the business of ethics to bring them under the influence of reason, and, selecting out of them such as are calculated to dignify and elevate man’s nature, to impart to them a trenchant and permanent character.
As respects that portion which flow in upon the mind from the internal world, it is the peculiar province of induction as reformed by our author, to separate such as are illusory from the real, and to construct out of the latter a series of axioms, expressing in hierarchical gradation the general system of laws by which the universe is governed.]

And it is a grand error to assert, that sense is the measure of things.

[The doctrine of the two last paragraphs may appear contradictory to the opinion of some philosophers, who maintain the infallibility of the senses, as well as of reason; but the dispute perhaps turns rather upon words than things.
Father Malbranche is express, that the senses never deceive us, yet as express that they should never be trusted, without being verified; charging the errors arising in this case upon human liberty, which makes a wrong choice. Also see Marin Mersenus’ De la Vérité de Sciences, chaps. 5, 6, 7, 8.
The difference may arise only from considering the senses in two different lights, viz., physically, or according to common use; and metaphysically, or abstractedly. The Novum Organum clears the whole.]

To remedy this, we have from all quarters brought together, and fitted helps for the senses; and that rather by experiments than by instruments; apt experiments being much more subtle than the senses themselves, though assisted with the most finished instruments.

We, therefore, lay no great stress upon the immediate and natural perceptions of the senses, but desire the senses to judge only of experiments, and experiments to judge of things: on which foundation, we hope to be patrons of the senses, and interpreters of their oracles.

And thus we mean to procure the things relating to the light of nature, and the setting it up in the mind; which might well suffice, if the mind were as white paper. But since the minds of men are so strangely disposed, as not to receive the true images of things, it is necessary also that a remedy be found for this evil.

The idols, or false notions, which possess the mind, are either acquired or innate. The acquired arise either from the opinions or sects of philosophers, or from preposterous laws of demonstration; but the innate cleave to the nature of the understanding, which is found much more prone to error than the senses. For however men may amuse themselves, and admire, or almost adore the mind, it is certain, that like an irregular glass, it alters the rays of things, by its figure, and different intersections.

The two former kinds of idols may be extirpated, though with difficulty; but this third is insuperable. All that can be done, is to point them out, and mark, and convict that treacherous faculty of the mind; lest when the ancient errors are destroyed, new ones should sprout out from the rankness of the soil: and, on the other hand, to establish this forever, that the understanding can make no judgment but by induction, and the just form thereof.

Whence the doctrine of purging the understanding requires three kinds of confutations, to fit it for the investigation of truth; viz., the confutation of philosophies, the confutation of demonstrations, and the confutation of the natural reason. But when these have been completed, and it has been clearly seen what results are to be expected from the nature of things, and the nature of the human mind, we shall have then furnished a nuptial couch for the mind and the universe, the divine goodness being our bride maid. And let it be the prayer of our Epithalamium, that assistance to man may spring from this union, and a race of discoveries, which will contribute to his wants and vanquish his miseries.

And this is the second part of the work.

Part III: Phænomena of the Universe; or, Natural  and Experimental History, was intended to be a vast collection of observed facts, and of results of experiments, with a view to the building up of a new Philosophy. These were to be gathered by the industry of men; and to be sorted and sifted by the Method or Instrument provided on which to found Philosophy: not only to pave and show the way, but also to tread in it ourselves, we shall next exhibit the phenomena of the universe; that is, such experience of all kinds, and such a natural history, as may afford a foundation to philosophy.

Bacon's explanation to this part:

Phenomena of the Universe; or, Natural and Experimental History, on which to found Philosophy.
But as we propose not only to pave and show the way, but also to tread in it ourselves, we shall next exhibit the phenomena of the universe; that is, such experience of all kinds, and such a natural history, as may afford a foundation to philosophy. For as no fine method of demonstration, or form of explaining nature, can preserve the mind from error, and support it from falling; so neither can it hence receive any matter of science.

Those, therefore, who determine not to conjecture and guess, but to find out and know; not to invent fables and romances of worlds, but to look into, and dissect the nature of this real world, must consult only things themselves. Nor can any force of genius, thought, or argument, be substituted for this labour, search, and inspection; not even though all the wits of men were united: this, therefore, must either be had, or the business be deserted forever.

But the conduct of mankind has hitherto been such, that it is no wonder, nature has not opened herself to them. For the information of the senses is treacherous and deceitful; observation careless, irregular, and accidental; tradition idle, rumorous, and vain; practice narrow and servile; experience blind, stupid, vague, and broken; and natural history extremely light and empty: wretched materials for the understanding to fashion into philosophy and the sciences.

Then comes in a preposterous subtlety of argumentation and sifting, as a last remedy, that mends not the matter one jot, nor separates the errors, Whence there are absolutely no hopes of enlarging arid promoting the sciences, without rebuilding them.

The first materials for this purpose must be taken from a new kind of natural history. The understanding must also have fit subjects to work upon, as well as real helps to work with. But our history, no less than our logic, differs from, the common in many respects; particularly, 1. In its end, or office; 2. Its collection; 3. Its subtlety; 4. Its choice; and 5. Its appointment for what is to follow.

Our natural history is not designed so much to please by its variety, or benefit by gainful experiments, as to afford light to the discovery of causes, and hold out the breasts to philosophy; for though we principally regard works, and the active parts of the sciences, yet we wait for the time of harvest, and would not reap the blade for the ear.

We are well aware that axioms, rightly framed, will draw after them whole sheaves of works: but for that untimely and childish desire of seeing fruits of new works before the season, we absolutely condemn and reject it, as the golden apple that hinders the progress.

With regard to its collection; we propose to show nature not only in a free state, as in the history of meteors, minerals, plants, and animals; but more particularly as she is bound, and tortured, pressed, formed, and turned out of her course by art and human industry. Hence we would set down all opposite experiments of the mechanic and liberal arts, with many others not yet formed into arts; for the nature of things is better discovered by the torturings of art, than when they are left to themselves.

Nor is it only a history of bodies that we would give; but also of their cardinal virtues, or fundamental qualities; as density, rarity, heat, cold, &c., which should be comprised in particular histories.

The kind of experiments to be procured for our history are much more subtle and simple than the common; abundance of them must be recovered from darkness, and are such as no one would have inquired after, that was not led by constant and certain tract to the discovery of causes; as being in themselves of no great use, and consequently not sought for their own sake, but with regard to works: like the letters of the alphabet with regard to discourse.

In the choice of our narratives and experiments we hope to have shown more care than the other writers of natural history; as receiving nothing but upon ocular demonstration, or the strictest scrutiny of examination; and not heightening what is delivered to increase its miraculousness, but thoroughly purging it of superstition and fable.

Besides this, we reject, with a particular mark, all those boasted and received falsehoods, which by a strange neglect have prevailed for so many ages, that they may no longer molest the sciences. For as the idle tales of nurses do really corrupt the minds of children, we cannot too carefully guard the infancy of philosophy from all vanity and superstition. And when any new or more curious experiment is offered, though it may seem to us certain and well founded; yet we expressly add the manner wherein it was made; that, after it shall be understood how things appear to us, men may beware of any error adhering to them, and search after more infallible proofs.

We, likewise, all along interpose our directions, scruples, and cautions; and religiously guard against phantoms and illusions.

Lastly, having well observed how far experiments and history distract the mind; and how difficult it is, especially for tender or prejudiced persons, to converse with nature from the beginning, we shall continually subjoin our observations, as so many first glances of natural history at philosophy; and this to give mankind some earnest, that they shall not be kept perpetually floating upon the waves of history; and that when they come to the work of the understanding, and the explanation of nature, they may find all things in greater readiness.

This will conclude the third part.

Part IV: Scala Intellectûs: Ladder of the Understanding: seems to have been intended for the preservation, in the exact order of their discovery, of some of the most striking of the results of the new Method: illustrations, in fact, of those chapters are found in the Novum Organum (I. 100 105.) which point out the ascending and descending character of the Baconian Induction where we shall be prepared to enter upon philosophy itself; to propose examples of inquiry and investigation, according to our own method, in certain subjects of the noblest kind, but greatly differing from each other, that a specimen may be had of every sort, and represent, as it were, to the eye, the whole progress of the mind, and the continued structure and order of invention, in the most chosen subjects, after the same manner as globes and machines facilitate the more abstruse and subtile demonstrations in mathematics.

Bacon's explanation to this part:

Ladder of the Understanding.
After the understanding has been thus aided and fortified, we shall be prepared to enter upon philosophy itself. But in so difficult a task, there are certain things to be observed, as well for instruction as for present use.

The first is to propose examples of inquiry and investigation, according to our own method, in certain subjects of the noblest kind, but greatly differing from each other, that a specimen may be had of every sort. By these examples we mean not illustrations of rules and precepts, but perfect models, which will exemplify the second part of this work, and represent, as it were, to the eye, the whole progress of the mind, and the continued structure and order of invention, in the most chosen subjects, after the same manner as globes and machines facilitate the more abstruse and subtle demonstrations in mathematics.

[This part is what the author elsewhere terms scala intellectus, or the progress of the understanding, and was intended to be supplied by him in the way of monthly productions. See his dedication of the History of the Winds to Prince Charles.]

We assign the fourth part of our work to these examples, which are nothing else than a particular application of the second part of our undertaking.

Part V: Prodromi sive Anticipationes Philosophiæ. Precursors, or Anticipators, of the Second Philosophy: was to follow a specimen of that new philosophy, to which all was to be introductory, and which was to crown the whole.

Prodromi sive Anticipationes Philosophiæ secundæ. These seem to have been intended partly to prepare the mind for the new Philosophy, so that men should not be entirely dazzled when that so bright light broke upon them; and partly, to be a pledge of results, and to console the eagerness of mankind; lest weary with so long preparation, and desiring the comforts and fruit of civil life, they should abandon the new way, and walk on contentedly in the narrow never altering limits of the old paths. This part, therefore, will consist of such things as we have invented, experienced, or added by the same common use of the understanding that others employ Secundæ.

Bacon's explanation to this part:

Precursors, or Anticipators, of the Second Philosophy.
The fifth part is only temporary, or of use but till the rest are finished; whence we look upon it as interest till the principal be paid; for we do not propose to travel hoodwinked, so as to take no notice of what may occur of use in the way.

This part, therefore, will consist of such things as we have invented, experienced, or added, by the same common use of the understanding that others employ. For as we have greater hopes from our constant conversation with nature, than from our force of genius, the discoveries we shall thus make may serve as inns on the road, for the mind to repose in, during its progress to greater certainties.

But this, without being at all disposed to abide by anything that is not discovered, or proved, by the true form of induction. Nor need any one be shocked at this suspension of the judgment, in a doctrine which does not assert that nothing is knowable; but only that things cannot be known except in a certain order and method: whilst it allows particular degrees of certainty, for the sake of commodiousness and use, until the mind shall enter on the explanation of causes.

Nor were those schools of philosophers, who held positive truth to be unattainable, inferior to others who dogmatized at will. They did not, however, like us, prepare helps for the guidance of the senses and understanding, as we have done, but at once abolished all belief and authority, which is a totally different and almost opposite matter.

Part VI: Philosophia Secunda sive Scientia Activa. Second Philosophy; or, Active Science: a complete system of Philosophy; an Encyclopaedia of all knowledge, duly arranged; in fact, a summary of all that the Sciences have done or can do towards enlarging the limits of man’s Knowledge or his Power. This last branch, stretching, as it was intended to do, across the whole domain of knowledge, Bacon was fain to confess, lay beyond his skill and power; and he left it to posterity to be filled up.

Bacon's explanation to this part:

Second Philosophy; or, Active Science.
The sixth and last part of our work, to which all the rest are subservient, is to lay down that philosophy which shall flow from the just, pure, and strict inquiry hitherto proposed. But to perfect this, is beyond both our abilities and our hopes, yet we shall lay the foundations of it, and recommend the superstructure to posterity.

We design no contemptible beginning to the work; and anticipate that the fortune of mankind will lead it to such a termination as is not possible for the present race of men to conceive. The point in view is not only the contemplative happiness, but the whole fortunes, and affairs, and powers, and works of men. For man being the minister and interpreter of nature, acts and understands as far as he has observed of the order, the works and mind of nature, and can proceed no farther; for no power is able to loose or break the chain of causes, nor is nature to be conquered but by submission: whence those twin intentions, human knowledge and human power, are really coincident; and the greatest hinderance to works is the ignorance of causes.

The capital precept for the whole undertaking is this, that the eye of the mind be never taken off from things themselves, but receive their images truly as they are. And God forbid that ever we should offer the dreams of fancy for a model of the world; but rather in his kindness vouchsafe to us the means of writing a revelation and true vision of the traces and moulds of the Creator in his creatures.

May thou, therefore, O Father, who gavest the light of vision as the first fruit of creation, and who hast spread over the fall of man the light of thy understanding as the accomplishment of thy works, guard and direct this work, which, issuing from thy goodness, seeks in return thy glory.

When thou hadst surveyed the works which thy hands had wrought, all seemed good in thy sight, and Thou restedst. But when man turned to the works of his hands, he found all vanity and vexation of spirit, and experienced no rest. If, however, we labour in thy works, Thou wilt make us to partake of thy vision and sabbath; we, therefore, humbly beseech Thee to strengthen our purpose, that Thou mayst be willing to endow thy family of mankind with new gifts, through our hands, and the hands of those in whom Thou shalt implant the same spirit.

It is as though his Instauratio Magna gradually enlarged its borders,
and from beginning as a book ended as knowledge itself.
It is, indeed, doubtful whether Bacon believed that this part
would ever take the form of a book at all.